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Abstract. In this chapter, we consider whether the outsourcing of inci-
dent management is a viable technological approach that may be trans-
ferable to other cloud security management requirements. We review a
viable approach to outsourcing incident response management and con-
sider whether this can be applied to other cloud security approaches,
starting with the concept of using proper measurement for a cloud secu-
rity assurance model. We demonstrate how this approach can be applied,
not only to the approach under review, but how it may be applied to
address other cloud security requirements.
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1 Introduction
The cloud has been referred to as “outsourcing on steroids”(Jaatun et al., 2011),
and in the following we review a proposed approach to outsourcing incident re-
sponse management (Reyes and Jaatun, 2015), and consider whether this ap-
proach might be transferable to other cloud security requirements, starting in
this case with a particular approach to cloud security addressing the importance
of proper measurement for a cloud security assurance model (Duncan and Whit-
tington, 2015e). Reyes and Jaatun (2015) indicate that outsourcing of incident
management is a viable security approach for many organizations, but that tran-
sitioning between providers frequently is a challenge. Duncan and Whittington
(2015e) suggest that defining proper measures for evaluating the effectiveness of
an assurance model, which they have developed to ensure cloud security, is vital
to ensure the successful implementation and continued running of the model.
The authors recognise that responsibility must lie with the board. However, in
this work, we consider the viability of outsourcing these requirements to deliver
an independent assurance of delivered security.
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The fundamental concepts of information security are confidentiality, in-
tegrity, and availability (CIA). Beautement and Pym (Beautement and Pym,
2010) provide an account of the misunderstandings prevalent in information se-
curity which arise through confusion between (declarative) objectives of (Parker,
1998)(Neumann, 1995) information security operations with the (operational)
mechanisms deployed in order to achieve these objectives. Achieving informa-
tion security in the cloud is not a trivial process. There are a great many chal-
lenges to overcome and, with Pym, Duncan and Whittington addressed some
of those in earlier work (Duncan et al., 2013), developing a conceptual model
for cloud security assurance, where they addressed three key challenges, namely
standards, proposed management method and complexity. Duncan and Whit-
tington (2015e) extended these key challenges to address a total of six possible
challenges, which we expand on in Section 3.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 2 summarises the
main points related to outsourcing of incident response. In Section 3, we out-
line the work of Duncan and Whittington which highlights the requirements to
be addressed. In Section 4, we consider whether these requirements might rea-
sonably be provided through outsourcing, and how we might approach this. In
Section 5, we discuss the implications of our findings and in Section 6 we offer
our conclusions.
2 Outsourcing of Incident Management
An organization may have several motivations for outsourcing incident manage-
ment. Reyes and Jaatun (2015) list the following:
– Cost
– Difficulties in hiring, training and retaining staff
– Services you might not want to provide yourself
– Physically hardened facilities with latest infrastructure
– Enterprise-wide management of security strategy
– Access to threat and countermeasure information
– Global prosecution
– Service performance 24x7
Reyes interviewed representatives from organizations who are transnational
organizations selected based on the managed security service provider’s (MSSP)
market presence (Reyes and Jaatun, 2015; Reyes, 2015). Six large MSSPs and
an emerging one (dubbed “A” to “G”) contributed to the interviews; for more
details on each MSSP, see Reyes (2015).
The findings are organized based on three different stages: Pre-operation,
Operation and Post-operation. Pre-operation refers to the stage where an or-
ganization has not created a contract with any provider to acquire incident
management services. Operation describes the stage where there is an ongoing
contract between the customer and the provider to outsource incident manage-
ment services. Finally, the Post-operation stage deals with a normal contract
completion or an early termination.
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2.1 Pre-Operation
Identifying the services needed Many similar services have different names
at different providers, which makes it difficult for customers to choose the right
service. Organization A recommends making an in-depth search of the services
and then get an independent view from a third party, to understand what their
strengths and weaknesses are, and what might be suitable for the company.
Organization C recommends that providers should be clear about where these
services are located in the incident management process, where the starting
point is, where the ending point is and what resources are required from the cus-
tomer in order to implement the services. Organization D, F and G recommend
providers to devote time helping potential clients to understand how what they
are doing is different from what others do and what some of the differences in
their proposal are. Organization F advises the customers to not choose services
through technical specifications but according to the real challenges that they
are trying to address.
Choosing the right provider Companies are not aware of the broad diversity
of providers that offer incident management services. Organization A advises
the companies to have a subscription or a working relationship with an analyst
company or a neutral third party in order to get an independent view of the
providers, helping to understand the MSSP market segmentation, provider’s
capabilities, flexibility and customer satisfaction. Organization F recommends
to find out about the provider’s pro-activity, the skills and knowledge from their
personnel and the methodology which their processes are aligned to.
Taking staff morale into consideration Staff morale might be affected by
outsourcing services that were previously run in-house. Organization B recom-
mends involving the staff, and making them understand why the decision was
made. Organization F advises MSSPs to persuade their customers that what
they are doing is to take away the repeatable processes, so that the customer’s
security personnel can do the interesting and new tasks. Instead of losing job
positions, the in-house personnel would be benefited by improving its tasks.
Adapting to foreign language communication when using global out-
sourced services Outsourcing services to global companies might impact in-
ternal communication, since staff might not be used to talking to people in
another language. Organization B recommends taking internal communication
into account when choosing a service provider.
Predicting resources and justifying them inside the business Customers
may have difficulties predicting how much resources or help they are going to
need and justifying it within their business. Organization E advises to take
advantage of cyber attacks reported in the news to make justifications easier.
4 Bob Duncan et al.
Having control over the outsourced service MSSPs prefer to have control
of the process because that allows them the ability to keep a particular price
for a commodity. The customers on the other hand, are reluctant to provide the
control. Organization F recommends MSSPs to negotiate this with the customers
especially at contract time because constant changes are required in a rapid
manner and should be aligned to good security practices.
2.2 Operation
Communication between external and internal incident management
teams If clear roles and communication mechanisms have not been established
in the internal incident management team, this can cause communication con-
flicts. Organization A describes that it is important that the customers have
developed some forensic readiness and incident management documentation de-
scribing IRT roles and responsibilities.
Multiple providers interaction during an incident Customers may have
multiple providers supporting the same incident which, even if they are assigned
to do different tasks, can have some overlap. Organization C recommends that
there should be some hierarchy involved when multiple providers are engaged in
the same incident, to make sure that somebody is in charge and perhaps solve
overlapping tasks. Organization E describes that the customer should be the
one dictating how the investigation would be done and defining the separation
of duties to be handled by the companies that are brought in. Organization G
recommends to inform the customer about overlaps and to be proactive and
address the rest of the providers in charge of a specific security component
overlapping, providing them with specifications for modifications.
Collecting logs from systems and infrastructure The use of logs is some-
thing that does not necessarily require many resources, but it provides great help
when having an incident. Organization D advises to collect sufficient logs and
data in order to facilitate and improve the customer’s incident response process.
This will allow verifying the information of an incident and would significantly
speed the provider’s response enabling some response functions to be performed
remotely.
Providing emergency response services to new customers Emergency
response services are available 24 hours a day, every day. Organization A advises
that experienced security professionals which have developed their skills through
different cases are the most suitable to provide help quickly in an unknown
infrastructure. Organization C describes that some customers prefer to engage
multiple providers when emergency response services are required.
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Having appropriate staff to provide response to emergency response
calls MSSPs require having people available to respond when needed. Organi-
zation C advises that providers should be prepared to provide the appropriate
people at the appropriate time, since their staff might be actively engaged in
different tasks.
Reaching global support when system breaches involve global com-
panies Some companies might have complex systems either in their internal
infrastructure or due to mergers with other companies. When there is a breach
in companies with complex systems such as cloud services, international foren-
sics might be an issue. Organization A recommends not looking at the whole
company, but first finding the breach and then working your way through it and
related systems. If there are complex systems involved in the breach, only then
global resources might be required.
Combine the strategic information and intelligence Not all vendors have
access to the same level of intelligence. Organization A describes that the quality
of the input that you have access to as a vendor is a big differentiator, but its
meaning can only be extracted by combining it with strategic information either
from history or from experience. Organization E advises that intelligence can
help with detection of anomalies and indicators of compromise to stop targeted
attacks.
Implementing massive security services that will work without false
positives Many customers want to get security services alerting only about the
real issues and not being alerted by stuff that is not relevant. Organization A
describes that it depends on the quality of the services but this would achieved
once a broader integration of IT, network and security systems occurs.
Keeping the customers Customers might switch providers due to not getting
the agreed service or because the service is or becomes too expensive. Organi-
zation A describes that in order to keep a customer it is important to build a
trusted relationship between the provider and the customer.
Cultural differences might impact the working behavior Offshoring is
the relocation of an outsourced service from one country to another that provides
cheaper labor costs. The cultural differences in those outsourcing destinations
might impact the communication and the working behavior in the provider’s
staff. Organization B explains that having workers with big cultural differences
demand follow up activities and inter-cultural communication in order to under-
stand the differences and get the job done.
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Unavailable personnel working in countries with natural, societal or
political risk factors Different circumstances such as natural disasters, strikes
or riots among others might restrict offshore workers to reach their working
place. Organization B describes that having offshore offices spread over different
locations is a good way to spread the risk.
Remote response enabled by agents IT departments might be reluctant
to the use of agents because increased complexity on an endpoint may cause
increased customer service calls, help desk calls, and time for evaluating new
software releases. Organization D and E recommend working with customers to
help convincing their ultimate decision maker as to why the benefit of running
the agent at the endpoint is greater than the cost.
Lack of skilled personnel Shortage of people with capabilities for incident
response activities. It is difficult to hire as many people as is needed. Organiza-
tion D advises to hire more junior talent to develop their skills providing them
with formal training and in-depth hands-on experience. Organization E advises
to create bonds with universities and research groups to find dedicated people
and train them. Organization G recommends offering students a part time job
while they write their thesis. Once the students graduate, organizations can se-
lect those that are skilled and want to keep inside by offering a full time job
position.
Incident response roles are not clearly defined Incident response roles
are not clearly defined in the industry, when hiring incident response experts
there is a wide variation of the capabilities, level of experience and expertise
that is needed. Organization D recommends defining internally what these roles
actually are for the company’s needs. It is important to understand, when hiring
new personnel, what they really have experience in and how that is related to
what it is needed at any particular point.
2.3 Post-Operation
Knowledge transition of customer services from one provider to an-
other when a customer changes provider Providers might be reluctant
to pass knowledge that took many years to get. Organization B describes that
providers might transition the problem knowledge that they are obliged to but
not the rest. Having a proper documentation and a continuous revision of it dur-
ing the meetings with the customer might help to keep everything documented
so that there won’t be any gaps when a provider transition will occur. Orga-
nization D highlights that the new provider should be aware that the previous
provider may not have much incentive to participate in the process. Some cases
it is needed to educate and train the new people that have been hired to perform
the same services.
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Understanding the customer needs and expectations when switching
providers Not understanding the new customer’s expectations and its infras-
tructure could make the transition challenging for the provider receiving the new
costumer and deteriorate the relationship from the beginning. Organization A
emphasizes the importance of getting familiar with the infrastructure both at
the customer and previous provider’s facilities. It is important to understand
what the critical assets are, what does the customer want to protect, and where
did the previous provider fail. The more the provider knows about the customer
then the better it would be in shape to provide protection and build a trusted re-
lationship between the parties. Organization C describes that the provider needs
to understand the new customer’s challenges in order to identify the services that
can be offered in that category and propose something to address them based
on their prior experience.
3 The Importance of Proper Measurement for a Cloud
Security Assurance Model
In this section, we summarize the Duncan and Whittington (2015e) paper on
the importance of proper measurement for a cloud security model.
3.1 The Challenges
The fundamental concepts of information security are confidentiality, integrity,
and availability (CIA), a concept developed when it was common practice for
corporate management to run a company under agency theory. We have all seen
how agency theory has failed to curb the excesses of corporate greed. The same
is true for cloud security, which would suggest a different approach is needed.
We have identified six key points to address: definition of security goals, com-
pliance with cloud security standards, audit issues, the impact of management
approaches on security, and how complexity and the lack of responsibility and
accountability affects cloud security.
In looking at the definition of security goals, we have recognised that the
business environment is constantly changing, as are corporate governance rules
and this would clearly imply changing measures would be required. More em-
phasis is now being placed on responsibility and accountability (Huse, 2005),
social conscience (Gill, 2008), sustainability (Ioannidis et al., 2013)(Kolk, 2008),
resilience (Chapin et al., 2009)(Chang et al., 2016) and ethics (Arjoon, 2012).
Responsibility and accountability are, in effect, mechanisms we can use to
help achieve all the other security goals. Since social conscience and ethics are
very closely related, we can expand the traditional CIA triad to include sustain-
ability, resilience and ethics. This expansion of security requirements can help
address some of the shortcomings of agency theory, but also provides a perfect
fit to stewardship theory. Stewardship carries a broader acceptance of responsi-
bility than the self-interest embedded in agency. This breadth extends to acting
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in the interests of company owners and potentially society and the environment
as a whole.
On the matter of achieving compliance with standards in practice, we have
identified the use of assurance to achieve security through compliance and audit.
With compliance, there are a number of challenges to address. Since the evolution
of cloud computing, a number of cloud security standards have evolved, but
there is still no standard which offers complete security, which is a limitation.
Even compliance with all standards will not guarantee complete security, which,
presents another disadvantage (Duncan and Whittington, 2014).
The pace of evolution of new technology far outstrips the capability of in-
ternational standards organizations to keep up with the changes (Willingmyre,
1997), adding to the problem and meaning it may not be resolved any time
soon. We have argued that companies need to take account of these gaps in the
standards when addressing issues of compliance. In (Duncan and Whittington,
2014), we have addressed the question of whether compliance with standards,
assurance and audit can provide security, and in (Duncan and Whittington,
2015d), we have addressed one of the fundamental weaknesses of the standards
compliance process.
Auditing in the accountancy world has enjoyed the benefit of over a century
of practice and experience, yet there remain differences of opinion and a num-
ber of problems are yet to be resolved. Duncan and Whittington (Duncan and
Whittington, 2014) provide some background on this issue. Cloud audit can not
be considered a mature field, and there will be some way to go before it can
catch up with work done in the accounting profession. Clearly further research
will be needed in this area.
Looking at management approach, we would argue that a shift from agency
behaviour to a stewardship approach (Duncan and Whittington, 2015a) can go
a long way to reducing the major weaknesses inherent in an agency approach
to security in cloud ecosystems. We have observed that cloud service providers
(CSPs) have developed their cloud business models using agency theory. Pallas
(2014) suggest that agency theory models the current relationship between CSPs
and cloud users very well, further suggesting this expresses all the weaknesses of
agency and highlights many of the issues still faced today.
Given the potential multiplicity of actors, and the complexities of their rela-
tionships with each other in cloud ecosystems, it is clear that simple traditional
agency relationships (where each actor looks to their own short term ends) will
no longer be able to handle fully the security implications for users of these
ecosystems. There is a clear need for developing a stronger mechanism to ensure
that users of such ecosystems can be assured of the security of their informa-
tion. We have addressed (Duncan and Whittington, 2015a) the cloud security
issue with management method, and argued that the historic reliance on agency
theory to run companies can present a barrier to effective security.
In considering complexity, we have observed that since cloud computing was
developed, the majority of security based research has concentrated on providing
technical solutions to solve the security problem. While many excellent solutions
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have been proposed, cloud security can never be achieved by technical means
alone.
First, the core business architecture comprises a combination of people, pro-
cess and technology (PWC, 2012), thus a solution which addresses only one of
these key elements will always be doomed to failure. Second, a cloud user can
take as many steps to secure their business as they wish, but a key ingredient in
the equation is the fact that all cloud processes run on someone else’s hardware,
and often software too — the CSP’s. The cloud relationship needs to include
the CSP as a key partner in the pursuit of achieving security. Unless and until
CSPs are willing to share this goal, technical solutions will be doomed to failure.
Third, the additional complexities which cloud brings into the security equation
must be recognised, and dealt with appropriately. Increased complexity brings
with it increased risk. If this risk is not recognised, and dealt with appropriately,
this will inhibit the possibility of achieving good security.
Currently, cloud users effectively have to treat cloud services as a black box,
since they have no control over what goes on inside, or behind the scenes. This
puts cloud users at a singular disadvantage when it comes to issues of privacy
and security. Regulators are taking a far more aggressive approach to breaches,
and the cloud user is the one who ends up carrying the can and getting the
punitive fines issued by the regulator.
This leads to the issue of lack of responsibility and accountability. Stan-
dard service level agreement (SLA) offerings from the major players currently
ignore accountability, assurance, audit, confidentiality, compliance, integrity, pri-
vacy, responsibility and security, merely offering availability as the focus of their
measure of performance. The onus for measuring and proving unacceptable per-
formance is neatly passed to the customer, which, with the inclusion of some
suitably deeply buried clauses in the small print, assures the buck invariably
never stops with the CSP.
Companies who are cloud users are quite properly legally held responsible
and accountable to a variety of regulators throughout industry under privacy
and security regulations. Fines for non-compliance are reaching punitive levels,
and many regulators have extreme levels of sanction at their disposal. Yet, CSPs
are not held to account for their often not inconsiderable role in such failures!
This issue with CSP SLAs is not a trivial issue to address. CSPs need to provide
users with assurance, through compliance and audit, that they can provide a
level of service capable of meeting user requirements in confidentiality, integrity,
privacy and security. CSPs should be prepared to offer cloud users performance
guarantees in all their required areas, not just on availability. CSPs need to
become accountable to users for meeting these requirements, by which means
they will be able to demonstrate a responsible and ethical approach to their
customers, and at the same time, providing an extremely robust and dependable
service to all cloud users.
We further argue that the CSPs should provide monitoring tools to collect
sufficient information to demonstrate that they have achieved the required level
of performance, rather than leaving it for customers to find out when something
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goes wrong. CSPs are much better placed to do this, since cloud customers will
not necessarily have access to all the systems necessary for this to happen. We
have further argued (Duncan and Whittington, 2015b) that this will require
a significant change in attitude from the CSPs, leading to the development of
better security oriented SLAs, which will improve the approach to security for
all actors within the cloud ecosystem.
This was the basis on which, with Pym, we developed a conceptual framework
for cloud security assurance(Duncan et al., 2013), expanding on earlier works
(Beautement and Pym, 2010)(Baldwin et al., 2011), which seeks to address the
issues faced in trying to achieve security in the cloud, and provides a more ef-
fective means for business to achieve both cloud security assurance along with
appropriate standards compliance, by providing continuous assurance through
both compliance and audit. We draw on natural resource management research
(Chapin et al., 2009)(Kao, 2007) which provides some very clear illustrations of
the effectiveness of stewardship, presenting a clear systems view of the issues ad-
dressed. The framework we have proposed addresses these key challenges facing
cloud users.
3.2 How our Framework Operates
Fig. 1. A Declarative Cloud Three-Dimensional Security Matrix
The framework functions by taking a 3 dimensional security approach to
how the company is organised. On one dimension there is the business architec-
ture, which covers people, process and technology; the second dimension covers
the security properties, which extends the traditional CIA approach by adding
sustainability, resilience and ethics; and the third dimension is the systems archi-
tecture of the business, which addresses the systems, services and applications
used by the business, to which we must add the cloud models of infrastructure,
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platform and software as a service (IaaS), (PaaS) and (SaaS). The framework
then identifies and addresses every point in the matrix where each of the three
dimensions intersect.
There are 4 stages of process involved in running the model. There is the
declarative stage, where management set the goals to be achieved. Next the
operational stage collects data to measure how well the company is meeting
these declarative goals. Then, internal audit will provide assurance through audit
and compliance checks to confirm the integrity of the process. Finally, external
audit will essentially double check that everything undertaken will have been
compliant and thus compliance with standards can be achieved, together with
the assurance that the declarative goals of management are being met.
Thus, management need to determine their declarative position on each of
these intersecting points, and further, must determine how performance will be
measured. Management are responsible for defining proper measurements and
metrics to be used in the framework, and this is what we will now address.
3.3 How to Develop Useful Measurements
Duncan and Whittington (2015e) provide an extensive list of literature on the
subject of measurement, which we will not reiterate here. We will simply focus
on the development of useful measures for a company. Defining a generic set of
measures is unlikely to be useful, since every business is different. This is a task
for management. However, we think it will be useful to provide some general
assistance by way of a few examples of how to go about it. We will start by
looking at each dimension in turn.
Measuring people can be relatively straightforward. Each employee has a
unique employee number, a unique computer access code and password, and ac-
cess rights to whatever areas are appropriate for carrying out their job. Some
companies will already have electronic or biometric systems installed and func-
tioning, others might not, but identifying who is who ought to be relatively
straightforward. Most companies will have their processes well documented with
a unique reference number assigned to each process.
While these processes may well have been documented for a considerable pe-
riod of time, it is important to recognise that they may have been defined before
security formed part of the requirements. This should be recognised and appro-
priate steps taken to address this. Technology, too, should be simple enough, as
each piece of technology, whether servers, desktop, or mobile device will have a
unique asset number, and internet connectivity can be recorded via the unique
media access control (MAC) address inside the hardware, as well as the internet
protocol (IP) address used to connect to the network, whether from inside the
company, or from outside the company via the internet.
Looking at systems next, each piece of technology will have an operating
system, which will be identifiable. There will be one or more services running
on the equipment, which will be identifiable, and there will be one or more
applications running on the equipment, all of which will be identifiable. Where
access to cloud systems is available, this will be either at a high level, such as
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SaaS or some service such as desktop as a service (DaaS), which can be identified.
Equally, if the access is to a lower level of service such as PaaS or IaaS, this too
can be identified. There may be multiple systems accessed, operated by multiple
providers, which may also involve brokers or other service providers, all of which
can be identified.
This brings us to a more difficult area, the security properties. Confidentiality
can be achieved by ensuring only the correctly authorised people can be granted
access to confidential information. This can be achieved by proper access control,
and monitoring. Integrity is slightly more challenging, as it is technically more
challenging to ensure that information, once saved into a system has not been
tampered with, particularly in the case of databases. This can be addressed by
logging every change made to every transaction within a system, logging who
made the change, when, from what location and so on. Thus each change in the
information state can be preserved, which would allow recreation of the original
if the change was malicious.
However, our requirement to address the new security properties of sustain-
ability, resilience and ethics presents the biggest challenge. We could address
sustainability of security by using redundancy to ensure continuity of operations
in the event of some business disaster or major security breach. This may involve
an element of lost time due to set up and configuration time needed to restore
systems.
Resilience could be addressed by having a permanently running system mir-
ror which allows for an extremely rapid recovery from unexpected shock. The
additional costs of addressing sustainability and resilience would need to be
considered. For business critical systems, the additional costs of ensuring sus-
tainability and resilience may end up providing cheap insurance.
Ethics, which generally would include company approach to corporate social
responsibility, could be addressed by viewing how suppliers approach these is-
sues, usually disclosed in annual reports, corporate social responsibility reports
or on the company website.
Clearly CSPs who concentrate on availability in their SLAs without con-
sidering accountability, assurance, audit, confidentiality, compliance, integrity,
privacy, responsibility and security, thus leaving the cloud user to carry the can,
might well be considered as irresponsible and unethical in their behaviour. The
same might be said for companies who provide poor service in other areas, such
as outsourced activities which might have an impact on security and privacy.
3.4 Addressing Two Critical Remaining Obstacles to Cloud
Security
We would like to think that there are no weaknesses in the conceptual frame-
work we have developed for cloud security assurance. But to do so would be
na¨ıve, as the framework has been necessarily developed to address all aspects
of cloud security under the control of the company operating the framework.
Unfortunately, the very mechanism of cloud computing means that not all areas
are completely under the control of the company operating the framework. At
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least one or more companies involved in the cloud ecosystem will not be under
the control of the company operating the framework, and this presents a key
weakness.
Our proposed framework addresses all three areas of people, process and
technology, yet is still not foolproof, and here are some of the main reasons for
this: CSP SLA limitations, and unwillingness to change; The threat environment;
Standards issues; Management reluctance to take security seriously. One of the
most important of these is the SLA between the company and the CSP. It is
no accident that the standard SLA offerings from the major CSPs focus on
availability. Their business model is geared to providing availability as the main
service performance measure to which they purport to be accountable.
Accountability, assurance, audit, confidentiality, compliance, integrity, pri-
vacy, responsibility and security do not feature in the standard SLA (Duncan
and Whittington, 2015b). It is important that companies recognise that this
represents the current status. Any additional requirements must be negotiated
directly with the CSP, although it is encouraging to note that following an EU
pilot study (EU, 2012), the EU Commission proposed new guidelines for a stan-
dard EU SLA (EU, 2014).
Another key area to be considered is the magnitude of the threat environ-
ment. Companies are bound by legislation, sometimes regulation, the need to
comply with standards, industry best practice and are accountable for their ac-
tions. Attackers have no such constraints. They have different agendas, different
skills levels, capabilities and resources at their disposal. Between them all, they
can attack 24/7, 365 days a year. They don’t work to rule, go home at 5:00pm,
take weekends off or go on holiday, at least not until they have the cash, in which
case there are plenty more happy to take their place. In addition to this, Kasper-
sky (2013) suggest that over 200,000 new malware threats are being developed
globally every day.
We are concerned about developing proper metrics for the six security goals
of our proposed security assurance model. This will not be a trivial exercise and
clearly we cannot do justice to all these areas within the space of this chapter.
Accordingly, we will address each of these areas individually during the next
year as part of our ongoing research.
4 Can we outsource Measurement and How would we do
it?
Management guru Harrington (1999) once said “Measurement is the first step
that leads to control and eventually to improvement. If you can’t measure some-
thing, you can’t understand it. If you can’t understand it, you can’t control it.
If you can’t control it, you can’t improve it.”
In considering whether we can outsource measurement and thinking about
how we can do it, we look at Duncan and Whittington (2016a) where the authors
first consider the cloud audit problem, and how this can impact on our plan. We
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also consider in Duncan and Whittington (2016b) how correct use of the audit
trail can help us ensure that a good solution to this problem can be achieved.
In previous work (Duncan and Whittington, 2015b) on enhancing cloud se-
curity and privacy, the authors addressed issues arising due to the cloud service
provider’s (CSP)’s lack of accountability in the standard service level agreement
(SLA). The authors discuss the importance of the role assurance plays, and the
two main mechanisms used to achieve this, namely compliance and audit.
Before understanding how the use of cloud impacts on the audit process, and
how it differs from conventional IT audit, we need to first understand what audit
is, why we need to do it, who should be doing it and how it should be done. We
must also understand what special difficulties the use of cloud brings to audit.
We therefore revisit the authors’ definition of audit.
The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) defines audit as (OED, 1989): (“To
make an official systematic examination of (accounts), so as to ascertain their ac-
curacy”) and requires outsiders who are deemed to be both objective and expert
to form their own opinion of what is being audited and then to publicly state
their confidence (or otherwise) in the reliability of what they have investigated.
Auditing is not straightforward or easy. Just as with accounting auditors, objec-
tivity is difficult when companies pay auditors directly and auditors would also
like to be retained for the following year. Audit is also potentially very expensive
if done well by the best experts in the field and there is a temptation to reduce
the experts’ role to one of advising, often writing checklists to be administered
by qualified technicians.
We first consider the three main purposes of audit, who should be carrying
it out, and how it should be done. First, the most widely understood of which
is the statutory requirement for financial statements to be audited by an inde-
pendent external auditor, which has been a cornerstone of confidence in global
financial systems since auditing was introduced. It provides assurance that com-
pany managers have presented a “true and fair” view of a company’s financial
performance and position, underpinning the trust and obligation of stewardship
between company management and the owners of the company, the shareholders.
A second purpose of audit is IT systems audit. Traditional audit approaches
often involved treating IT systems as “black box” systems, meaning trust was
placed in the IT systems, and looking at the functioning of the IT system was
not considered part of the statutory audit. These audits are usually conducted
by IT specialists, often in conjunction with accounting audit professionals to
ensure the functioning of these systems are properly understood. However, these
are not mandated under statute, and there is no requirement for an annual audit
to be undertaken.
A third purpose of audit is compliance, either with regulations, or more
often with standards. This is often undertaken to assure shareholders and other
stakeholders that the company is using best practice in its operations. This is
particularly the case in cloud computing, where systems are operated by third
parties beyond the control of the cloud user. Currently, the difficulties associated
with performing an adequate cloud audit present one of the key barriers to cloud
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adoption (Armbrust et al., 2010). Again, these audits are not mandated under
statute, nor is there a requirement for an annual audit to be undertaken.
Clearly, in order to take an economic approach to providing a satisfactory
level of service, utilising the first purpose of audit would not be appropriate, due
to the high costs involved. However, the second purpose of audit would provide
a high level of assurance to cloud users if it were carried out on the monitoring
system at the beginning of the contract. Thereafter, using the third purpose of
audit could provide assurance in the long run that the outsourcing company is
providing an adequate level of performance.
Having said that, there are some shortcomings with the cloud audit trail pro-
cess, as discussed by Duncan and Whittington (2016a), which we would do well
to take into account. The six security issues addressed in Duncan and Whitting-
ton (2015c) have been expanded to ten, with the addition of the following four
security issues: measurement and monitoring; management attitude to security;
security culture in the company; and the threat environment.
Since the Duncan and Whittington (2015e) paper already covered the mea-
surement issue, this leaves the last three to consider. There is no doubt that
management approach to security will have a major impact on how well a com-
pany can stand up to attack, and indeed this approach will also determine how
good the security culture within the company will be. Our approach to solving
these issues is to minimise the impact any adverse management approach is likely
to have on security. Obviously, we have no control over the threat environment,
our only approach being to make life as difficult as possible for attackers to gain
access.
A fundamental element of the audit process is the audit trail, and having two
disciplines involved in providing cloud audit services means there are two dif-
ferent disciplines to contend with, namely accounting professionals and security
professionals. An obvious concern is what is meant by the term “audit trail”.
It is easy to assume that everyone is talking about the same thing, but is that
actually the case? To an accounting professional, the meaning of an audit trail
is very clear.
The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) (OED, 1989) has two useful defini-
tions of an audit trail: “(a) Accounting: a means of verifying the detailed trans-
actions underlying any item in an accounting record; (b) Computing: a record
of the computing processes which have been applied to a particular set of source
data, showing each stage of processing and allowing the original data to be re-
constituted; a record of the transactions to which a database or a file has been
subjected”. This suggests common understanding, but often this is not evident
in computing research.
What is abundantly clear, both from an accounting and a computing security
perspective, is that users should only be able to read the audit trail (Anderson,
2008). While it is simple enough to restrict users to read-only access, this does
not apply to the system administrators. This presents an issue where an intruder
gets into a system, escalates privileges until root access is obtained, and is then
free to manipulate, or delete the audit trail entries in order to cover their tracks.
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A simple solution to this key problem would be for the outsourcing contractor
to run the audit trail on their own systems, thus removing all vulnerabilities from
the user’s system and ensuring continuity of monitoring and preservation of a
full and proper audit trail.
Turning back to the questions of the chapter, we have now established the
mechanics of how we might achieve this goal, meaning we have a viable method-
ology that can be used to achieve these goals. Thus we need to consider in which
cases this methodology might be deployed. Whether or not they have the will, it
is certainly the case that large corporates can afford the calibre of staff necessary
to take care of these issues in-house.
However, in the case of small to meduim sized enterprises (SME)s and micro
enterprises (ME)s, these companies may well not have the resources to deploy an
adequate calibre of staff to handle this challenging technical task. Equally, the
management may not have sufficient knowledge to be able to define adequate and
proper metrices to measure. This is likely to put such companies at a commercial
disadvantage as compared to large corporates.
However, by providing them with an opportunity to have access to this ser-
vice as an outsourced service, provided to a high standard, this will free them and
their staff to concentrate on the areas of business which they are most skilled at.
This should permit them to take comfort that a vital, and highly specialised, re-
quirement needed to ensure the security of their business is being properly taken
care of, while at the same time, removing some of the competitive disadvantage
that they would otherwise suffer from.
5 Discussion
Pearson and Charlesworth (2009) argue that accountability may be a solution
to the privacy problem in the cloud, but this may be true also in the general
case if we can persuade providers that “doing the right thing” may be a business
advantage (Jaatun et al., 2016). Incident response in the cloud is difficult for
many reasons, not least because many cloud services are delivered as part of
complex provider chains, and incidents that occur at one part of the chain may
have implications at the other end (Jaatun and Tøndel, 2015).
Some recent developments may provide additional incentives to an account-
ability-based approach. The European Data Protection Regulation (EDPR)(EU,
2016), which will come into force by 2018, has specific provisions for data breach
notification, which may encourage providers to use notification technology that is
already available. However, it may be argued that being too open about incidents
that have occurred in your system both could create bad publicity and allow your
competitors (not to mention other attackers) too much insight into your weak
spots (Frøystad et al., 2016).
Against this backdrop emerges a major selling point for outsourcing incident
management services to a trusted third party. Cloud customers could ensure that
their MSSP either covers the entire provider chain, or that the provider chain is
covered by a set of MSSPs that collaborate. This avoids having to reveal “arbi-
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trary” incident information to the next provider in the chain, instead sending it
to the MSSP, who in this context would fill a similar role as an auditor. It is not a
long stretch to imagine that such an MSSP also could do other forms of security-
relevant measurements, either using agents or other mechanisms (Doelitzscher
et al., 2013).
Organization A describes that good communication with internal incident
management teams depends on the customer’s forensic readiness, meaning that
the customer is prepared and the stakeholders are involved in the case. If there
is not a proper working model in the internal incident management team, there
might be communication conflicts due to a lack of internal communication (Tøndel
et al., 2014).
A customer that has security controls in place, trains its people, has imple-
mented security awareness, and knows what the threats might be, gets more ben-
efit from the outsourced incident management services. Organization E describes
that when internal incident management teams are mature and self-sufficient,
they look for assistance in services that are too complex. Organization A and C
explain that outsourced incident management services could benefit an internal
incident management team by providing it with more manpower, specialized ser-
vices, managerial skills, a global perspective on threats and multiple sources of
intelligence. However, in some cases it might affect internal teams that are trying
to respond in the same manner if there are not clear lines of responsibility in
terms of which team does what type of tasks. Moreover, some internal incident
management teams might get affected by a reduction of staff.
Organization B comments that current incident management teams benefit
from participating on discussions and inputs coming from the provider getting a
different perspective in order to make decisions and reach agreements to deal with
an incident. Organization D highlights that some internal incident management
teams might perceive the MSSPs as the help needed to prevent being fired when
an incident is out of control. Ahmad et al. (2015) highlight the importance of
learning from incidents, and the difficulties some experience with information
sharing even within the same organization. Using professional third party could
be a way to bridge this gap.
Organizations A and D describe that they offer different types of SLAs in
terms of different services. Organization A’s responsibilities and penalties are
dependent on what the customer is looking for and is willing to pay. The penal-
ties differentiate on what services are outsourced, traditional managed security
services or managed incident handling services, the level of the incident missed
and the severity of the attack.
Organization B explains that the roles and responsibilities are dependent on
what the client wants. Organization B offers different types of SLAs not only in
terms of different services but also according to the environment (production,
test, development, etc.). The SLAs related with the production environment
have higher cost and penalties than the rest of the environments. The penalties
at the SLAs might differ from account to account. However, Organization B
has compensation agreements, meaning that if an SLA is missed and there is
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a penalty, the compensation agreement could be used in order to condone the
penalty as long as the compensation agreement is achieved.
Organization C has very specific SLAs for incident reporting or detection.
If there is an incident or suspected incident, there is an escalation process to
notify the customer, which is done by phone or by other means, based on its
severity. But Organization C uses a different set of SLAs when it comes to
incident response. Responsibilities and penalties are dependent on what is being
offered and what the consequences are for the customer.
Organization E considers that there is no way to promise some customer
that the provider’s resources will be on site within a very specific amount of
time. Everything is done in a best effort manner, and there are no artificial time
limits. There is no way that a provider can promise to get to the bottom of
something in an investigation in a certain period of time, because each situation
is different (Schneier, 2014). It is hard to state SLAs because there is no level of
predictability in these kinds of situations.
Proper measurement and monitoring can not only provide an effective means
of ensuring proper standards of security and privacy can be maintained on a
day to day basis, but in addition, can provide effective compliance assurance to
ensure cloud users can demonstrate a highly ethical approach to the stewardship
of customers’ data. Where the measurement and monitoring solution is added to
the incident response solution, this can provide a repository of additional long
term forensic material in the event of a cloud breach, as well as freeing internal
company resources to address other important company issues.
6 Conclusion
Outsourcing incident management security services is a viable option to get
security competence for responding to today’s threats. Outsourcing incident
management services seems to be a good option for small and medium size
organizations that don’t require tailored services. These organizations can reap
affordable comprehensive security without investing in new infrastructure or be-
ing burdened by deployment and management costs. Large organizations are
benefiting from specialized services or by having the chance to focus on tasks
that demand specialized skills instead of repeatable tasks. Tailored solutions are
not easily achieved by outsourced services. It is a complex process that requires
both internal and external staff to accomplish.
All organizations can evaluate and assess what MSSPs offer according to their
needs. However, the service descriptions at the provider’s websites are unclear,
and often confusing. Mapping those services to either the incident management
model, or, e.g., the Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) decision-making life-
cycle phases (Boyd, 1987) will enable better understanding of what the customers
are lacking to increase the effectiveness of their organizational cyber-defense
capabilities.
Knowledge transition of customer services from one provider to another re-
quires proper documentation. This documentation is not effectively done, ac-
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cording to some of the interviewees, and in some cases there is knowledge that
doesn’t reach the new provider. Therefore exchange formats between providers
to transfer the customer services knowledge could help to guarantee the cus-
tomers that their data will be properly handled during and after the transition.
A public file format for exchange of customer services knowledge should be de-
veloped to automate as much of the knowledge transition process as possible. It
would make cross-organizational coordination more efficient and cost effective.
We have looked at some of the challenges facing companies who seek to obtain
good cloud security assurance. We have seen how weaknesses in standard CSP
SLAs can impact on cloud security. We have identified issues with cloud security
standards, and how that might impact on cloud security. We have considered
how the lack of accountability can impact on security. We have briefly outlined
how our cloud security assurance framework operates, and have discussed how
the above issues must additionally be addressed.
In looking at measurement literature, we see how some aspects are quite
mature and well understood, but that more modern methods of management
such as sustainability, resilience and ethics present new challenges due to the
dearth of research in these areas. In looking at how our framework operates,
we have discussed how the best security approach needs to consider not just a
technical solution, but must address people, process and technology.
We have touched on how these difficult areas of security might be approached
as part of a comprehensive security solution based on our proposed framework.
Clearly, companies could benefit from further research in several of these areas,
and in particular, measurement. However, we would caution that action is needed
now, not several years down the line when research reaches a more complete level
of success in these areas. The threat environment is too dangerous. Companies
have to act now to try to close the door, otherwise it may be too late.
Where a company is prepared to use an outsourced service for incident re-
sponse, it is clear that there will be synergies to be gained by also using the
same outsourced service to measure and monitor the effectiveness of the ongoing
security position of the company as a whole. Our proposal will address one of
the fundamental weaknesses of security monitoring, namely the lack of security
which conventional systems impose on the audit trail, which will clearly provide
a considerable improvement on the status quo.
Acknowledgements
The research in this paper has partly been supported by the European Commis-
sion (A4Cloud project, grant no. 317550).
Bibliography
Ahmad, A., Maynard, S. B., and Shanks, G. (2015). A case analysis of in-
formation systems and security incident responses. International Journal of
Information Management, 35(6):717 – 723.
Anderson, R. J. (2008). Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable
Distributed Systems, volume 50. Wiley.
Arjoon, S. (2012). Corporate Governance: An Ethical Perspective. Journal of
Business Ethics, 61(4):343–352.
Armbrust, M., Fox, A., Griffith, R., Joseph, A. D., Katz, R., Konwinski, A., Lee,
G., Patterson, D., Rabkin, A., Stoica, I., and Zaharia, M. (2010). A View of
Cloud Computing. Communications of the ACM, 53(4):50—-58.
Baldwin, A., Beres, Y., Mont, M. C., Shiu, S., Duggan, G., Johnson, H., and
Middup, C. (2011). An Experiment in Decision Making WEIS 2011. In Weis,
pages 1–28.
Beautement, A. and Pym, D. (2010). Structured systems economics for security
management. In Weis, pages 1–20.
Boyd, J. R. (1987). Organic design for command and control. {A} discourse on
winning and losing.
Chang, V., Ramachandran, M., Yao, Y., Kuo, Y. H., and Li, C. S. (2016). A
resiliency framework for an enterprise cloud. International Journal of Infor-
mation Management, 36(1):155–166.
Chapin, F. S., Kofinas, G. P., and Folke, C. (2009). Principles of ecosystem stew-
ardship: Resilience-based natural resource management in a changing world.
Springer.
Doelitzscher, F., Ruebsamen, T., Karbe, T., Reich, C., and Clarke, N. (2013).
Sun behind clouds - on automatic cloud security audits and a cloud audit
policy language. International Journal On Advances in Networks and Services,
6(1&2).
Duncan, B., Pym, D. J., and Whittington, M. (2013). Developing a Conceptual
Framework for Cloud Security Assurance. In Cloud Computing Technology and
Science (CloudCom), 2013 IEEE 5th International Conference on (Volume 2),
pages 120–125, Bristol. IEEE.
Duncan, B. and Whittington, M. (2014). Compliance with Standards, Assurance
and Audit: Does this Equal Security? In Proceedings of the 7th International
Conference on Security of Information and Networks, pages 77–84, Glasgow.
ACM.
Duncan, B. and Whittington, M. (2015a). Company Management Approaches
Stewardship or Agency: Which Promotes Better Security in Cloud Ecosys-
tems? In Cloud Computing 2015, pages 154–159, Nice. IEEE.
Duncan, B. and Whittington, M. (2015b). Enhancing Cloud Security and Pri-
vacy: Broadening the Service Level Agreement. In The 14th IEEE Interna-
tional Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Commu-
nications (IEEE TrustCom-15), pages 1088–1093, Helsinki, Finland.
A Blueprint for Cloud Security Requirements 21
Duncan, B. and Whittington, M. (2015c). Information Security in the Cloud:
Should We be Using a Different Approach? In 2015 IEEE 7th International
Conference on Cloud Computing Technology and Science (CloudCom), pages
1–6, Vancouver.
Duncan, B. and Whittington, M. (2015d). Reflecting on whether checklists can
tick the box for cloud security. In Proceedings of the International Confer-
ence on Cloud Computing Technology and Science, CloudCom, volume 2015-
February, pages 805–810, Singapore. IEEE.
Duncan, B. and Whittington, M. (2015e). The Importance of Proper Measure-
ment for a Cloud Security Assurance Model. In 2015 IEEE 7th International
Conference on Cloud Computing Technology and Science (CloudCom), pages
1–6, Vancouver.
Duncan, B. and Whittington, M. (2016a). Enhancing Cloud Security and Pri-
vacy: The Power and the Weakness of the Audit Trail. In Submitted to Cloud
Computing 2016, pages 1–6, Rome. IEEE.
Duncan, B. and Whittington, M. (2016b). Enhancing Cloud Security and Pri-
vacy: The Power and the Weakness of the Audit Trail. In Submitted to Cloud
Computing 2016, pages 1–6, Rome. IEEE.
EU (2012). Unleashing the Potential of Cloud Computing in Europe.
EU (2014). Cloud Service Level Agreement Standardisation Guidelines. Tech-
nical report, EU Commission, Brussels.
EU (2016). Reform of EU data protection rules.
Frøystad, C., Gjære, E. A., Tøndel, I. A., and Jaatun, M. G. (2016). Security in-
cident information exchange for cloud services. In Proceedings of International
Conference on Internet of Things and Big Data.
Gill, A. (2008). Corporate Governance as Social Responsibility: A Research
Agenda. Berkeley J. Int’l L., 26(2):452–478.
Harrington, H. J. (1999). Measurement. CIO, (September):19.
Huse, M. (2005). Accountability and Creating Accountability: a Framework for
Exploring Behavioural Perspectives of Corporate Governance. British Journal
of Management, 16(S1):S65–S79.
Ioannidis, C., Pym, D., and Williams, J. (2013). Sustainability in information
stewardship: Time Preferences, Externalities and Social Co-Ordination. In
Weis 2013, pages 1–24.
Jaatun, M. G., Nyre, A˚. A., Alapnes, S., and Zhao, G. (2011). A Farewell to
Trust: An Approach to Confidentiality Control in the Cloud. In Proceedings
of the 2nd International Conference on Wireless Communications, Vehicular
Technology, Information Theory and Aerospace & Electronic Systems Tech-
nology (Wireless Vitae Chennai 2011).
Jaatun, M. G., Pearson, S., Gittler, F., Leenes, R., and Niezen, M. (2016). En-
hancing accountability in the cloud. International Journal of Information
Management. to appear.
Jaatun, M. G. and Tøndel, I. A. (2015). How much cloud can you handle? In
Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES), 2015 10th International Con-
ference on, pages 467–473.
Kao, R. (2007). Stewardship Based Economics. World Scientific.
22 Bob Duncan et al.
Kaspersky (2013). Global Corporate IT Security Risks: 2013. Technical Report
May.
Kolk, A. (2008). Sustainability, accountability and corporate governance: Ex-
ploring multinationals’ reporting practices. Business Strategy and the Envi-
ronment, 17(1):1–15.
Neumann, P. G. (1995). Computer-Related Risks. 1995. Reading: Addison-
Wesley.
OED (1989). Oxford English Dictionary.
Pallas, F. (2014). An agency perspective to cloud computing. In Lecture Notes in
Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence
and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), volume 8914, pages 36–51. Springer.
Parker, D. B. (1998). Fighting Computer Crime: A New Framework for Protect-
ing Information. Wiley.
Pearson, S. and Charlesworth, A. (2009). Accountability as a way forward for
privacy protection in the cloud. In Cloud Computing, pages 131–144.
PWC (2012). UK Information Security Breaches Survey - Technical Report
2012. Technical Report April, London.
Reyes, A. (2015). Outsourced incident management services.
Reyes, A. and Jaatun, M. G. (2015). Passing the Buck: Outsourcing Incident
Response Management. In 2015 IEEE 7th International Conference on Cloud
Computing Technology and Science (CloudCom), pages 503–508.
Schneier, B. (2014). The future of incident response. IEEE Security Privacy,
12(5):96–96.
Tøndel, I. A., Line, M. B., and Jaatun, M. G. (2014). Information security inci-
dent management: Current practice as reported in the literature. Computers
& Security, 45:42–57.
Willingmyre, G. T. (1997). Standards at the Crossroads. StandardView,
5(4):190–194.
